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Abstract
Two-factor authentication protects online accounts even
if passwords are leaked. Most users, however, prefer
password-only authentication. One reason why two-
factor authentication is so unpopular is the extra steps
that the user must complete in order to log in. Currently
deployed two-factor authentication mechanisms require
the user to interact with his phone to, for example, copy
a verification code to the browser. Two-factor authentica-
tion schemes that eliminate user-phone interaction exist,
but require additional software to be deployed.
In this paper we propose Sound-Proof, a usable
and deployable two-factor authentication mechanism.
Sound-Proof does not require interaction between the
user and his phone. In Sound-Proof the second authen-
tication factor is the proximity of the user’s phone to
the device being used to log in. The proximity of the
two devices is verified by comparing the ambient noise
recorded by their microphones. Audio recording and
comparison are transparent to the user, so that the user
experience is similar to the one of password-only authen-
tication. Sound-Proof can be easily deployed as it works
with current phones and major browsers without plug-
ins. We build a prototype for both Android and iOS. We
provide empirical evidence that ambient noise is a robust
discriminant to determine the proximity of two devices
both indoors and outdoors, and even if the phone is in
a pocket or purse. We conduct a user study designed
to compare the perceived usability of Sound-Proof with
Google 2-Step Verification. Participants ranked Sound-
Proof as more usable and the majority would be will-
ing to use Sound-Proof even for scenarios in which two-
factor authentication is optional.
1 Introduction
Software tokens on modern phones are replacing dedi-
cated hardware tokens in two-factor authentication (2FA)
mechanisms. Using a software token, in place of a hard-
ware one, improves deployability and usability of 2FA.
For service providers, 2FA based on software tokens
results in a substantial reduction of manufacturing and
shipping costs. From the user’s perspective, there is no
extra hardware to carry around and phones can accom-
modate software tokens from multiple service providers.
Despite the improvements introduced by software to-
kens, most users still prefer password-only authentica-
tion for services where 2FA is not mandatory [36, 12].
This is probably due to the extra burden that 2FA causes
to the user [25, 51], since it typically requires the user to
interact with his phone.
Recent work [14, 41] improves the usability of 2FA by
eliminating the user-phone interaction. However, those
proposals are not yet deployable as their requirements
are not met by today’s phones, computers or browsers.
In this paper, we focus on both the usability and de-
ployability aspect of 2FA solutions. We propose Sound-
Proof, a two-factor authentication mechanism that is
transparent to the user and can be used with current
phones and with major browsers without any plugin. In
Sound-Proof the second authentication factor is the prox-
imity of the user’s phone to the computer being used to
log in. When the user logs in, the two devices record the
ambient noise via their microphones. The phone com-
pares the two recordings, determines if the computer is
located in the same environment, and ultimately decides
whether the login attempt is legitimate or fraudulent.
Sound-Proof does not require the user to interact with
his phone. The overall user experience is, therefore,
close to password-only authentication. Sound-Proof
works even if the phone is in the user’s pocket or purse,
and both indoors and outdoors. Sound-Proof can be eas-
ily deployed since it is compatible with current phones,
computers and browsers. In particular, it works with
any HTML5-compliant browser that implements the We-
bRTC API [24], which is currently being standardized by
the W3C [15]. Chrome, Firefox and Opera already sup-
port WebRTC, Internet Explorer plans to support it [31],
and we anticipate that other browsers will adopt it soon.
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Similar to other approaches that do not require user-
phone interaction nor a secure channel between the
phone and the computer (e.g., [14]), Sound-Proof is not
designed to protect against targeted attacks where the at-
tacker is co-located with the victim and has the victim’s
login credentials. Our design choice favors usability and
deployability over security and we argue that this can
edge for larger user adoption.
We have implemented a prototype of Sound-Proof for
both Android and iOS. Sound-Proof adds, on average,
less than 5 seconds to a password-only login operation.
This time is substantially shorter than the time overhead
of 2FA mechanisms based on verification codes (roughly
25 seconds [50]). We also report on a user study we con-
ducted which shows that users prefer Sound-Proof over
Google 2-Step Verification [22].
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We propose Sound-Proof, a novel 2FA mechanism
that does not require user-phone interaction and is
easily deployable. The second authentication fac-
tor is the proximity of the user’s phone to the com-
puter from which he is logging in. Proximity of the
two devices is verified by comparing the ambient
audio recorded via their microphones. Recording
and comparison are transparent to the user.
• We implement a prototype of our solution for both
Android and iOS. We use the prototype to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of Sound-Proof in a number of
different settings. We show that Sound-Proof works
even if the phone is in the user’s pocket or purse and
that it fares well both indoors and outdoors.
• We conducted a user study to compare the perceived
usability of Sound-Proof and Google 2-Step Verifi-
cation. Participants ranked the usability of Sound-
Proof higher than the one of Google 2-Step Verifica-
tion, with a statistically significant difference. More
importantly, we found that most participants would
use Sound-Proof even if 2FA were optional.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
details our assumptions and goals while Section 3 re-
views alternative approaches and discusses why they do
not fulfill our objectives. Section 4 provides an overview
on audio similarity techniques. We present Sound-Proof
in Section 5 and its prototype implementation in Sec-
tion 6. Section 7 evaluates Sound-Proof, while Section 8
reports on our user study. We discuss limitations and
ways to further improve Sound-Proof in Section 9. Sec-
tion 10 reviews related work and Section 11 concludes
the paper.
2 Assumptions and Goals
System Model. We assume the general settings of
browser-based web authentication. The user has a user-
name and a password to authenticate to a web server. The
server implements a 2FA mechanism that uses software
tokens on phones.
The user points his browser to the server’s webpage
and enters his username and password. The server veri-
fies the validity of the password and challenges the user
to prove possession of the second authentication factor.
Threat Model. We assume a remote adversary who has
obtained the victim’s username and password via phish-
ing, leakage of a password database, or via other means.
His goal is to authenticate to the server on behalf of the
user. In particular, the adversary visits the server’s web-
page and enters the username and password of the vic-
tim. The attack is successful if the adversary convinces
the server that he also holds the second authentication
factor of the victim.
We further assume that the adversary cannot compro-
mise the victim’s phone. If the adversary gains control
of the platform where the software token runs, then the
security of any 2FA scheme reduces to the security of
password-only authentication. Also, the adversary can-
not compromise the victim’s computer. The compromise
of the computer allows the adversary to mount a Man-In-
The-Browser attack [34] and hijack the victim’s session
with the server, therefore defeating any 2FA mechanism.
We do not address targeted attacks where the adver-
sary is co-located with the victim. 2FA mechanisms that
do not require the user to interact with his phone can-
not protect against targeted, co-located attacks. For ex-
ample, if 2FA uses unauthenticated short-range commu-
nication [14], a co-located attacker can connect to the
victim’s phone and prove possession of the second au-
thentication factor to the server. We argue that targeted,
co-located attacks are less common than non-selective,
remote attacks. Furthermore, any 2FA mechanism may
not warrant protection against powerful attackers. For
example, if 2FA uses verification codes, a determined at-
tacker may gain physical access to the phone or read the
code from a distance [6, 7, 37].
We do not consider Man-In-The-Middle adversaries.
Client authentication is not sufficient to defeat MITM at-
tacks in the context of web applications [29]. We also
do not address active phishing attacks where the attacker
lures the user into visiting a phishing website and re-
lays the stolen credentials to the legitimate website in
real-time. Such attacks can be thwarted by having the
phone detect the phishing domain [14, 35]. This requires
short-range communication between the phone and the
browser. However, seamless short-range communication
between the phone and the browser is currently not pos-
sible.
2
Design Goals.
• Usability. Users should authenticate using only
their username and password as in password-only
authentication. In particular, users should not be
asked to interact with their phone — not even to
pick up the phone or take it out of a pocket or purse.
• Deployability. The 2FA mechanism should
work with common smartphones, computers and
browsers. It should not require additional software
on the computer or the installation of browser plug-
ins. A plugin-based solution limits the usability of
the system because (i) a different plugin may be re-
quired for each server, and (ii) the user must install
the plugin every time he logs in from a computer for
the first time. The mechanism should also work on
a wide range of smartphones. We therefore discard
the use of special hardware on the phone like NFC
chips or biometric sensors.
3 Alternative Approaches
In this section we discuss traditional 2FA mechanisms,
as well as 2FA proposals which minimize the user-phone
interaction. For each solution we argue why it fails to
meet our usability and deployability goals.
3.1 Traditional 2FA
Hardware Tokens. Hardware tokens range from the
RSA SecurID [17] to recent dongles [53] that comply
with the FIDO U2F [20] standard for universal 2FA.
Such solutions require the user to carry and interact with
the token and may be expensive to deploy because the
service provider must ship one token per customer.
Software Tokens. Google 2-Step Verification [22] is an
example of 2FA based on verification codes, that uses
software tokens on phones. The verification code is re-
trieved either from an application running on the phone
or via SMS. Such mechanisms require the user to copy
the verification code from the phone to the browser.
Duo Push [16] and Encap Security [18] prompt the
user with a push message on his phone with information
on the current login attempt. Both solutions still require
the user to interact with his phone to authorize the login.
3.2 Reduced-Interaction 2FA
Short-range Radio Communication. PhoneAuth [14]
is a 2FA proposal that leverages unpaired Bluetooth com-
munication between the browser and the phone, in or-
der to eliminate user-phone interaction. The Bluetooth
channel enables the server (through the browser) and
the phone to engage in a challenge-response protocol
which provides the second authentication factor. Simi-
larly, [35] and [41] also leverage Bluetooth communica-
tion between the browser and the phone.
These schemes require the browser to expose a Blue-
tooth API that is currently not available on any browser.
A specification to expose a Bluetooth API in browsers
has been proposed by the Web Bluetooth Community
Group [49]. It is unclear whether the proposed API will
support the unauthenticated RFCOMM or similar func-
tionality which is required to enable seamless connec-
tivity between the browser and the phone. However, if
the Bluetooth connection is unauthenticated, an adver-
sary equipped with a powerful antenna may connect to
the victim’s phone from afar [52] and login on behalf of
the user, despite 2FA.
Authy [5] is another approach that allows for seamless
2FA using Bluetooth communication between the com-
puter and the phone. Authy, however, requires extra soft-
ware on the computer.
As an alternative to Bluetooth, the browser and the
phone can communicate over WiFi [41]. This approach
only works when both devices are on the same network.
Shirvanian et al., [41] use extra software on the computer
to virtualize the wireless interface and create a software
access point (AP) with which the phone needs to be asso-
ciated. The user has to perform this setup procedure ev-
ery time he uses a new computer to log in. Their solution
also requires a phone application listening for incoming
connections in the background, which is currently not
possible on iOS.
Finally, the browser and the phone can communicate
over NFC. NFC hardware is not commonly found in
commodity computers, and current browsers do not ex-
pose APIs to access NFC. Furthermore, a solution based
on NFC would not completely remove user-phone inter-
action because the user would still need to hold his phone
close to the computer.
We acknowledge that 2FA mechanisms that employ
direct communication between the browser and the
phone may provide additional security against remote at-
tackers. For example, the phone can detect if the user
tries to login on a phishing website and block the at-
tempt [14, 35]. The scheme in [41] further resists offline
dictionary attacks against compromised hashed pass-
word databases. Nevertheless, none of such solutions can
be deployed for the reasons we discussed above.
Near-ultrasound. SlickLogin [23] minimizes the user-
phone interaction transferring the verification code from
the computer to the phone using near-ultrasounds. The
idea is to use spectrum frequencies that are non-audible
for the majority of the population but that can be re-
produced by the speakers of commodity computers (>
18kHz). Using non-audible frequencies accommodates
for scenarios where users may not want their devices
to make audible noise. Due to their size, the speakers
of commodity computers can only produce highly direc-
tional near-ultrasound frequencies [39]. Near-ultrasound
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signals also attenuate faster, when compared to sounds in
the lower part of the spectrum (< 18kHz) [3, 28]. With
SlickLogin, the user must ensure that the speaker volume
is at a sufficient level during login. Also, login will fail
if a headset is plugged into the laptop. Finally, this ap-
proach may not work in scenarios where there is in-band
noise (e.g., when listening to music or in cafes) [28]. We
also note that a solution based on near-ultrasounds may
result unpleasant for young people and animals that are
capable of hearing sounds above 18kHz [38].
Location Information. The server can check if the com-
puter and the phone are co-located by comparing their
GPS coordinates. GPS sensors are available on all mod-
ern phones but are rare on commodity computers. If
the computer from which the user logs in has no GPS
sensor, it can use the geolocation API exposed by some
browsers [32]. Nevertheless, information retrieved via
the geolocation API may not be accurate, for example
when the device is behind a VPN or it is connected to a
large managed network (such as enterprise or university
networks). Furthermore, geolocation information can be
easily guessed by an adversary. For example, assume the
adversary knows the location of the victim’s workplace
and uses that location as the second authentication fac-
tor. This attack is likely to succeed during working hours
since the victim is presumably at his workplace.
Other Sensors. A 2FA mechanism can combine the
readings of multiple sensors that measure ambient char-
acteristics, such as temperature, concentration of gases
in the atmosphere, humidity, and altitude, as proposed
in [42]. These combined sensor modalities can be used
to verify the proximity between the computer through
which the user is trying to login and his phone. However,
today’s computers and phones lack the hardware sensors
that are required for such an approach to work.
4 Background on Sound Similarity
The problem of determining the similarity of two audio
samples is close to the problem of audio fingerprinting
and automatic media retrieval [13]. In media retrieval,
a noisy recording is matched against a database of ref-
erence samples. This is done by extracting a set of rel-
evant features from the noisy recording and comparing
them against the features of the reference samples. The
extracted features must be robust to, for example, back-
ground noise and attenuation. Bark Frequency Cepstrum
Coefficients [26], wavelets [8] or peak frequencies [48]
have been proposed as robust features for automatic me-
dia retrieval. Such techniques focus mostly on the fre-
quency domain representation of the samples because
they deal with time-misaligned samples. In our scenario,
we compare two quasi-aligned samples (the offset is less
than 150ms) and we therefore can also extract relevant
information from their time domain representations.
In order to consider both time domain and frequency
domain information of the recordings, we use one-third
octave band filtering and cross-correlation.
One-third Octave Bands. Octave bands split the audi-
ble range of frequencies (roughly from 20Hz to 20kHz)
in 11 non-overlapping bands where the ratio of the high-
est in-band frequency to the lowest in-band frequency
is 2 to 1. Each octave is represented by its center fre-
quency, where the center frequency of a particular oc-
tave is twice the center frequency of the previous octave.
One-third octave bands split the first 10 octave bands
in three and the last octave band in two, for a total of
32 bands. One-third octave bands are widely used in
acoustics and their frequency ranges have been standard-
ized [44]. The center frequency of the lowest band is
16Hz (covering from 14.1Hz to 17.8Hz) while the center
frequency of the highest band is 20kHz (covering from
17780Hz to 22390Hz). In the following we denote with
B = [lb−hb] a set of contiguous one-third octave bands,
from the band that has its central frequency at lbHz, to
the band that has its central frequency at hbHz.
Splitting a signal in one-third octave bands provides
high frequency resolution information of the original sig-
nal, while keeping its time-domain representation.
Cross-correlation. Cross-correlation is a standard mea-
sure of similarity between two time series. Let x, y de-
note two signals represented as n-points discrete time se-
ries,1 the cross-correlation cx,y(l) measures their similar-
ity as a function of the lag l ∈ [0,n−1] applied to y:
cx,y(l) =
n−1
∑
i=0
x(i) · y(i− l)
where y(i) = 0 if i< 0 or i> n−1.
To accommodate for different amplitudes of the two
signals, the cross correlation can be normalized as:
c′x,y(l) =
cx,y(l)√
cx,x(0) · cy,y(0)
where cx,x(l) is known as auto-correlation.
The normalization maps c′x,y(l) in [−1,1]. A value of
c′x,y(l) = 1 indicates that at lag l, the two signals have the
same shape even if their amplitudes may be different; a
value of c′x,y(l) = −1 indicates that the two signals have
the same shape but opposite signs. Finally, a value of
c′x,y(l) = 0 shows that the two signals are uncorrelated.
If the actual lag between the two signals is unknown,
we can discard the sign information and use the abso-
lute value of the maximum cross-correlation cˆx,y(l) =
max
l
(|c′x,y(l)|) as a metric of similarity (0≤ cˆx,y(l)≤ 1).
The computation overhead of cx,y(l) can be decreased
by leveraging the cross-correlation theorem and comput-
ing cx,y(l) = F−1(F(x)∗ ·F(y)), where F() denotes the
1For simplicity we assume both series to have the same length.
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Figure 1: Block diagram of the function that computes the similarity score between two samples. The computation takes place on
the phone. If Sx,y > τC and the average power of the samples is greater than τdB, the phone judges the login attempt as legitimate.
discrete Fourier transform and the asterisk denotes the
complex conjugate.
5 Sound-Proof Architecture
The second authentication factor of Sound-Proof is the
proximity of the user’s phone to the computer being used
to log in. The proximity of the two devices is determined
by computing a similarity score between the ambient
noise captured by their microphones. For privacy reasons
we do not upload cleartext audio samples to the server. In
our design, the computer encrypts its audio sample under
the public key of the phone. The phone receives the en-
crypted sample, decrypts it, and computes the similarity
score between the received sample and the one recorded
locally. Finally, the phone tells the server whether the
two devices are co-located or not. Note that the phone
never uploads its recorded sample to the server. Com-
munication between the computer and the phone goes
through the server. We avoid short-range communica-
tion between the phone and the computer (e.g., via Blue-
tooth) because it requires changes to the browser or the
installation of a plugin.
5.1 Similarity Score
Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the function that com-
putes the similarity score. Each audio signal is input to a
bank of pass-band filters to obtain n signal components,
one per each of the one-third octave bands that we take
into account. Let xi be the signal component for the i-th
one-third octave band of signal x. The similarity score
is the average of the maximum cross-correlation over the
pairs of signal components xi, yi:
Sx,y =
1
n
i=n
∑
i=1
cˆxi,yi(l)
where l is bounded between 0 and `max.
Server Phone
compute similarity
score
record audio
Browser
record audio
username,password
record, phone's PK
login accepted
or rejected
encrypted audio
record
encrypted audio
login accepted
or rejected
Figure 2: Sound-Proof authentication overview. At login, the
phone and the computer record ambient noise with their micro-
phones. The phone computes the similarity score between the
two samples and returns the result to the server.
5.2 Enrollment and Login
Similar to other 2FA mechanisms based on software to-
kens, Sound-Proof requires the user to install an ap-
plication on his phone and to bind the application to
his account on the server. This one-time operation can
be carried out using existing techniques to enroll soft-
ware tokens, e.g., [22]. We assume that, at the end of
the phone enrollment procedure, the server receives the
unique public key of the application on the user’s phone
and binds that public key to the account of that user.
Figure 2 shows an overview of the login procedure.
The user points the browser to the URL of the server and
enters his username and password. The server retrieves
the public key of the user’s phone and sends it to the
browser. Both the browser and the phone start recording
through their local microphones for t seconds. During
recording, the two devices synchronize their clocks with
the server. When recording completes, each device ad-
justs the timestamp of its sample taking into account the
clock difference with the server. The browser encrypts
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the audio sample under the phone’s public key and sends
it to the phone, using the server as a proxy. The phone de-
crypts the browser’s sample and compares it against the
one recorded locally. If the average power of both sam-
ples is above τdB and the similarity score is above τC, the
phone concludes that it is co-located with the computer
from which the user is logging in and informs the server
that the login is legitimate.
The procedure is completely transparent to the user if
the environment is sufficiently noisy. In case the environ-
ment is quiet, Sound-Proof requires the user to generate
some noise, for example by clearing his throat.
5.3 Security Analysis
Remote Attacks. The security of Sound-Proof stems
from the attacker’s inability to guess the sound in the vic-
tim’s environment at the time of the attack.
Let x be the sample recorded by the victim’s phone
and let y be the sample submitted by the attacker. A suc-
cessful impersonation attack requires the average power
of both signals to be above τdB, and each of the one-
third octave band components of the two signals to be
highly correlated. That is, the two samples must satisfy
Pwr(x)> τdB, Pwr(y)> τdB and Sx,y > τC with l < `max.
We bound the lag l between 0 and `max to increase
the security of the scheme against an adversary that suc-
cessfully guesses the noise in the victim’s environment
at the time of the attack. Even if the adversary correctly
guesses the noise in the victim’s environment and can
submit a similar audio sample, the two samples must be
synchronized with an error smaller than `max. We also
reject audio pairs where either sample has an average
power below the threshold τdB. This is in order to prevent
an impersonation attack when the victim’s environment
is quiet (e.g., while the victim is sleeping).
Quantifying the entropy of ambient noise, and hence
the likelihood of the adversary guessing the signal
recorded by the victim’s phone, is a challenging task.
Results are dependent on the environment, the language
spoken by the victim, his gender or age to cite a few.
In Section 7 we provide empirical evidence that Sound-
Proof can discriminate between legitimate and fraudulent
logins, even if the adversary correctly guesses the type of
environment where the victim is located.
Co-located Attacks. Sound-Proof cannot withstand at-
tackers who are co-located with the victim. A co-located
attacker can capture the ambient sound in the victim’s
environment and thus successfully authenticate to the
server, assuming that he also knows the victim’s pass-
word. Sound-Proof shares this limitation with other 2FA
mechanisms that do not require the user to interact with
his phone and do not assume a secure channel between
the phone and the computer (e.g., [14]). Resistance to
co-located attackers requires either a secure phone-to-
computer channel (as in [5, 41]) or user-phone interac-
tion (as in [16, 22]). However, both techniques impose a
significant usability burden.
6 Prototype Implementation
Our implementation works with Google Chrome (tested
with version 38.0.2125.111), Mozilla Firefox (tested
with version 33.0.2) and Opera (tested with version
25.0.1614.68). We anticipate the prototype to work with
different versions of these browsers, as long as they im-
plement the navigator.getUserMedia() API of We-
bRTC. We tested the phone application both on Android
and on iOS. For Android, on a Samsung Galaxy S3, a
Google Nexus 4 (both running Android version 4.4.4), a
Sony Xperia Z3 Compact and a Motorola Nexus 6 (run-
ning Android version 5.0.2 and 5.1.1, respectively). We
also tested different iPhone models (iPhone 4, 5 and 6)
running iOS version 7.1.2 on the iPhone 4, and iOS ver-
sion 8.1 on the newer models. The phone application
should work on different phone models and with differ-
ent OS versions without major modifications.
Web Server and Browser. The server component is
implemented using the CherryPy [45] web framework
and MySQL database. We use WebSocket [19] to
push data from the server to the client. The client-side
(browser) implementation is written entirely in HTML
and JavaScript. Encryption of the audio recording uses
AES256 with a fresh symmetric key; the symmetric key
is encrypted under the public key of the phone using
RSA2048. We use the HTML5 WebRTC API [15, 24].
In particular, we use the navigator.getUserMedia()
API to access the local microphone from within the
browser. Our prototype does not require browser code
modifications or plugins.
Software Token. We implement the software token as an
Android application as well as an iOS application. The
mobile application stays idle in the background and is
automatically activated when a push notification arrives.
Push messages for Android and iOS use the Google
GCM (Google Cloud Messaging) APIs [21] and Apple’s
APN (Apple Push Notifications) APIs [2] (in particular
the silent push notification feature), respectively. Phone
to server communication is protected with TLS.
Most of the Android code is written in Java (Android
SDK), while the component that processes the audio
samples is written in C (Android NDK). In particular, we
use the ARM Ne10 library, based on the ARM NEON
engine [4] to optimize vector operations and FFT com-
putations. The iOS application is written in Objective-C
and uses Apple’s vDSP package of the Accelerate frame-
work [1], in order to leverage the ARM NEON technol-
ogy for vector operations and FFT computations. On
both mobile platforms we parallelize the computation of
the similarity score across the available processor cores.
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Operations Mean (ms) Std.Dev.
Recording 3000 —
Similarity score computation 642 171
Cryptographic operations 118 15
Networking
WiFi 978 135
Cellular 1243 209
Table 1: Overhead of the Sound-Proof prototype. On average
it takes 4677ms (± 181ms) over WiFi and 4944ms (± 233ms)
over Cellular to complete the 2FA verification.
Time Synchronization. Sound-Proof requires the
recordings from the phone and the computer to be syn-
chronized. For this reason, the two devices run a sim-
ple time-synchronization protocol (based on the Network
Time Protocol [33]) with the server. The protocol is im-
plemented over HTTP and allows each device to com-
pute the difference between the local clock and the one
of the server. Each device runs the time-synchronization
protocol with the server while it is recording via its mi-
crophone. When recording completes, each device ad-
justs the timestamp of its sample taking into account the
clock difference with the server.
Run-time Overhead. We compute the run-time over-
head of Sound-Proof when the phone is connected ei-
ther through WiFi or through the cellular network. We
run 1000 login attempts with a Google Nexus 4 for each
connection type, and we measure the time from the mo-
ment the user submits his username and password to the
time the web server logs the user in. On average it takes
4677ms (± 181ms) over WiFi and 4944ms (± 233ms)
over Cellular to complete the 2FA verification. Table 1
shows the average time and the standard deviation of
each operation. The recording time is set to 3 seconds.
The similarity score is computed over the set of one-third
octave bands B = [50Hz−4kHz]. (Section 7.1 discusses
the selection of the band set.) After running the time-
synchronization protocol, the resulting clock difference
was, on average, 42.47ms (± 30.35ms).
7 Evaluation
Data Collection. We used our prototype to collect a
large number of audio pairs. We set up a server that
supported Sound-Proof. Two subjects logged in using
Google Chrome2 over 4 weeks. At each login, the phone
and the computer recorded audio through their micro-
phones for 3 seconds. We stored the two audio samples
for post-processing.
Login attempts differed in the following settings. En-
vironment: an office at our lab with either no ambient
2We used Google Chrome since it is currently the most popular
browser [43]. We have also tested Sound-Proof with other browsers
and have experienced similar performance (see Section 9).
noise (labelled as Office) or with the computer play-
ing music (Music); a living-room with the TV on (TV);
a lecture hall while a faculty member was giving a
lecture (Lecture); a train station (TrainStation); a cafe
(Cafe). User activity: being silent, talking, coughing, or
whistling. Phone position: on a table or a bench next
to the user, in the trouser pocket, or in a purse. Phone
model: Apple iPhone 5 or Google Nexus 4. Computer
model: Mac Book Pro “Mid 2012” running OS X10.10
Yosemite or Dell E6510 running Windows 7.
At the end of the 4 weeks we had collected between
5 and 15 login attempts per each setting, totaling 2007
login attempts (4014 audio samples).
7.1 Analysis
We used the collected samples to find the configuration
of system parameters (i.e., τdB, `max, B, and τC) that
led to the best results in terms of False Rejection Rate
(FRR) and the False Acceptance Rate (FAR). A false re-
jection occurs when a legitimate login is rejected. A false
acceptance occurs when a fraudulent login is accepted.
A fraudulent login is accepted if the sample submitted
by the attacker and the sample recorded by the victim’s
phone have a similarity score greater than τC, and if both
samples have an average power greater than τdB.
To compute the FAR, we used the following strategy.
For each phone sample collected by one of the subjects
(acting as the victim), we use all the computer samples
collected by the other subject as the attacker’s samples.
We then switch the roles of the two subjects and repeat
the procedure. The total number of victim–adversary
sample pairs we considered was 2,045,680.
System Parameters. We set the average power thresh-
old τdB to 40dB which, based on our measurements, is a
good threshold to reject silence or very quiet recordings
like the sound of a fridge buzzing or the sound of a clock
ticking. Out of 2007 login attempts we found 5 attempts
to have an average power of either sample below 40dB
and we discard them for the rest of the evaluation.
We set `max to 150ms because this was the high-
est clock difference experienced while testing our time-
synchronization protocol (see Section 6).
An important parameter of Sound-Proof is the set B of
one-third octave bands to consider when computing the
similarity score described in Section 5.1. The goal is to
select a spectral region that (i) includes most common
sounds and (ii) is robust to attenuation and directional-
ity of audio signals. We discarded bands below 50Hz to
remove very low-frequency noises. We also discarded
bands above 8kHz, because these frequencies are atten-
uated by fabric and they are not suitable for scenarios
where the phone is in a pocket or a purse. We tested all
sets of one-third octave bands B= [x−y] where x ranged
from 50Hz to 100Hz and y ranged from 630Hz to 8kHz.
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Figure 3: False Rejection Rate and False Acceptance Rate as a
function of the threshold τC for B = [50Hz−4kHz]. The Equal
Error Rate is 0.0020 at τC = 0.13.
We found the smallest Equal Error Rate (ERR, de-
fined as the crossing point of FRR and FAR) when us-
ing B = [50Hz− 4kHz]. Figure 3 shows the FRR and
FAR using this set of bands where the ERR is 0.0020 at
τC = 0.13. We experienced worse results with one-third
octave bands above 4kHz. This was likely due to the high
directionality of the microphones found on commodity
devices when recoding sounds at those frequencies [47].
We also computed the best set of one-third octave
bands to use in case usability and security are weighted
differently by the service provider.3 In particular, we
computed the sets of bands that minimized f =α ·FRR+
β ·FAR, for α ∈ [0.1, . . . ,0.9] and β = 1−α . Figure 4(b)
shows the set of bands that provided the best results for
each configuration of α and β . As before, we experi-
enced better results with bands below 4kHz. Figure 4(a)
plots the FRR and FAR against the possible values of α
and β . We stress that the set of bands may differ across
two different points on the x-axis.
Experiments in the remaining of this section were run
with the configuration of the parameters that minimized
the ERR to 0.0020: τdB = 40dB, `max = 150ms, B =
[50Hz−4kHz], and τC = 0.13.
7.2 False Rejection Rate
In the following we evaluate the impact of each setting
that we consider (environment, user activity, phone po-
sition, phone model, and computer model) on the FRR.
Figures 5 and 6 show a box and whisker plot for each
setting. The whiskers mark the 5th and the 95th per-
centiles of the similarity scores. The boxes show the
25th and 75th percentiles. The line and the solid square
3For example, a social network provider may value usability higher
than security.
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(a) False Rejection Rate and False Acceptance Rate when usability and
security have different weights.
B τc
α = 0.1, β = 0.9 [80Hz−2500Hz] 0.12
α = 0.2, β = 0.8 [50Hz−2500Hz] 0.14
α = 0.3, β = 0.7 [50Hz−2500Hz] 0.14
α = 0.4, β = 0.6 [50Hz−800Hz] 0.19
α = 0.5, β = 0.5 [50Hz−800Hz] 0.19
α = 0.6, β = 0.4 [50Hz−800Hz] 0.19
α = 0.7, β = 0.3 [50Hz−1000Hz] 0.2
α = 0.8, β = 0.2 [50Hz−1000Hz] 0.2
α = 0.9, β = 0.1 [50Hz−1250Hz] 0.21
(b) One-third octave bands and similarity score
threshold.
Figure 4: Minimizing f = α · FRR + β · FAR, for α ∈
[0.1, . . . ,0.9] and β = 1−α .
within each box mark the median and the average, re-
spectively. A gray line marks the similarity score thresh-
old (τC = 0.13) and each red dot in the plots denotes a
login attempt where the similarity score was below that
threshold (i.e., a false rejection).
Environment. Figure 5 shows the similarity scores for
each environment. Sound-Proof fares equally well in-
doors and outdoors. We did not experience rejections
of legitimate logins for the Music (over 432 logins), the
Lecture (over 122 logins), and the TV (over 430 logins)
environments. The FRR was 0.003 (1 over 310 logins)
for Office, 0.003 (1 over 370 logins) for TrainStation,
and 0.006 (2 over 338 logins) for Cafe.
User Activity. Figure 6(a) shows the similarity scores
for different user activities. In general, if the user makes
any noise the similarity score improves. We only expe-
rienced a few rejections of legitimate logins when the
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Figure 5: Impact of the environment on the False Rejection
Rate.
user was silent (TrainStation and Cafe) or when he was
coughing (Office). In the Lecture case the user could
only be silent. We also avoided whistling in the cafe, be-
cause this may be awkward for some users. The FRR
was 0.005 (3 over 579 logins) when the user was silent,
0.002 (1 over 529 logins) when the user was coughing, 0
(0 over 541 logins) when the user was speaking, and 0 (0
over 353 logins) when the user was whistling.
Phone Position. Figure 6(b) shows the similarity scores
for different phone positions. Sound-Proof performs
slightly better when the phone is on a table or on a bench.
Worse performance when the phone is in a pocket or in a
purse are likely due to the attenuation caused by the fab-
ric around the microphone. The FRR was 0.001 (1 over
667 logins) with the phone on a table, 0.001 (1 over 675
logins) with the phone in a pocket, and 0.003 (2 over 660
logins) with the phone in a purse.
Phone Model. Figure 6(c) shows the similarity scores
for the two phones. The Nexus 4 and the iPhone 5 per-
formed equally good across all environments. The FRR
was 0.002 (2 over 884 logins) with the iPhone 5 and
0.002 (2 over 1118 logins) with the Nexus 4.
Computer. Figure 6(d) shows the similarity scores for
the two computers we used. We could not find significant
differences between their performance. The FRR was
0.002 (3 over 1299 logins) with the MacBook Pro and
0.001 (1 over 703 logins) with the Dell.
Distance Between Phone and Computer. In some set-
tings (e.g., at home), the user’s phone may be away from
his computer. For instance, the user could leave the
phone in his bedroom while watching TV or working in
another room. We evaluated this scenario by placing the
computer close to the TV in a living-room, and testing
Sound-Proof while the phone was away from the com-
False Acceptance Rate
SC-SP SC-DP DC-DP
TV channel 1 1 0.1 0.1
TV channel 2 1 1 0
TV channel 3 1 0 -
TV channel 4 1 0 -
Web radio 1 1 0 0.4
Web radio 2 0.1 0.8 0.8
Web TV 1 0 0 0
Web TV 2 0 0 0
Table 2: False Acceptance Rate when the adversary and
the victim devices record the same broadcast media. SC-SP
stands for “same city and same Internet/cable provider”, SC-
DP stands for “same city but different Internet/cable providers”,
DC-DP stands for “different cities and different Internet/cable
providers”. A dash in the table means that the TV channel was
not available at the victim’s location.
puter. For this set of experiments we used the iPhone 5
and the MacBook Pro. The average noise level by the TV
was measured at 50dB. We tested 3 different distances: 4,
8 and 12 meters (running 20 login attempts for each dis-
tance). All login attempts were successful (i.e., FRR=0).
We also tried to log in while the phone was in another
room behind a closed door, but logins were rejected.
Discussion. Based on the above results, we argue that
the FRR of Sound-Proof is small enough to be practical
for real-world usage. To put it in perspective, the FRR of
Sound-Proof is likely to be smaller than the FRR due to
mistyped passwords (0.04, as reported in [30]).
7.3 Advanced Attack Scenarios
A successful attack requires the adversary to submit a
sample that is very similar to the one recoded by the vic-
tim’s phone. For example, if the victim is in a cafe, the
adversary should submit an audio sample that features
typical sounds of that environment. In the following we
assume a strong adversary that correctly guesses the vic-
tim’s environment. We also evaluate the attack success
rate in scenarios where the victim and the attacker access
the same broadcast audio source from different locations.
Similar Environment Attack. In this experiment we
assume that the victim and the adversary are located in
similar environments. For each environment, we com-
pute the FAR between each phone sample collected by
one subject (the victim) and all the computer samples
of the other subject (the adversary). We then switch the
roles of the two subjects and repeat the procedure. The
FAR for the Music and the TV environments were 0.012
(1063 over 91960 attempts) and 0.003 (311 over 90992
attempts), respectively. The FAR for the Lecture envi-
ronment was 0.001 (8 over 7242 attempts). When both
the victim and the attacker were located at a train station
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Figure 6: Impact of user activity, phone position, phone model, and computer model on the False Rejection Rate.
the FAR was 0.001 (44 over 67098 attempts). The FAR
for the Office environment was 0.025 (1194 over 47250
attempts). When both the victim and the attacker were in
a cafe the FAR was 0.001 (32 over 56994 attempts).
The above results show low FAR even when the at-
tacker correctly guesses the victim’s environment. This
is due to the fact that ambient noise in a given environ-
ment is influenced by random events (e.g., background
chatter, music, cups clinking, etc.) that cannot be con-
trolled or predicted by the adversary.
Same Media Attack. In this experiment we assume
that the victim and the adversary access the same audio
source from different locations. This happens, for ex-
ample, if the victim is watching TV and the adversary
correctly guesses the channel to which the victim’s TV
is tuned. We place the victim’s phone and the adver-
sary’s computer in different locations, but each of them
next to a smart TV that was also capable of streaming
web media. Since the devices have access to two iden-
tical audio sources, the adversary succeeds if the lag be-
tween the two audio signals is less than `max. We tested
4 cable TV channels, 2 web radios and 2 web TVs. For
each scenario, we run the attack 100 times and report
the FAR in Table 2. When the victim and the attacker
were in the same city, we experienced differences based
on the media provider. When the TVs reproduced con-
tent broadcasted by the same provider, the signals were
closely synchronized and the similarity score was above
the threshold τC. The FAR dropped in the case of web
content. When the TVs reproduced content supplied by
different providers, the lag between the signals caused
the similarity score to drop below τC in most of the cases.
The similarity score sensibly dropped when the victim
and the attacker were located in different cities.
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8 User Study
The goal of our user study was to evaluate the usabil-
ity of Sound-Proof and to compare it with the usability
of Google 2-Step Verification (2SV), since 2FA based on
verification codes is arguably the most popular. (We only
considered the version of Google 2SV that uses an appli-
cation on the user’s phone to generate verification codes.)
We stress that the comparison focuses solely on the us-
ability aspect of the two methods. In particular, we did
not make the participants aware of the difference in the
security guarantees, i.e., the fact that Google 2SV can
better resist co-located attacks.
We ran repeated-measure experiments where each par-
ticipant was asked to log in to a server using both mech-
anisms in random order. After using each 2FA mecha-
nism, participants ranked its usability answering the Sys-
tem Usability Scale (SUS) [11]. The SUS is a widely-
used scale to assess the usability of IT systems [9]. The
SUS score ranges from 0 to 100, where higher scores in-
dicate better usability.
8.1 Procedure
Recruitment. We recruited participants using a snow-
ball sampling method. Most subjects were recruited out-
side our department and were not working in or studying
computer science. The study was advertised as a user
study to “evaluate the usability of two-factor authenti-
cation mechanisms”. We informed participants that we
would not collect any personal information and offered a
compensation of CHF 20. Among all respondents to our
email, we discarded the ones that were security experts
and ended up with 32 participants.
Experiment. The experiment took place in our lab
where we provided a laptop and a phone to complete the
login procedures. Both devices were connected to the
Internet through WiFi. We set up a Gmail account with
Google 2SV enabled. We also created another website
that supported Sound-Proof and mimicked the Gmail UI.
Participants saw a video where we explained the two
mechanisms under evaluation. We told participants that
they would need to log in using the account credentials
and the hardware we provided. We also explained that
we would record the keystrokes and the mouse move-
ments (this allowed us to time the login attempts).
We then asked participants to fill in a pre-test ques-
tionnaire designed to collect demographic information.
Participants logged in to our server using Sound-Proof
and to Gmail using Google 2SV. We randomized the or-
der in which each participant used the two mechanisms.
After each login, participants rated the 2FA mechanism
answering the SUS.
At the end of the experiment participants filled in a
post-test questionnaire that covered aspects of the 2FA
mechanisms under evaluation not covered by the SUS.
8.2 Results
Demographics. 58% of the participants were between
21 and 30 years old. 25% of the participants were be-
tween 31 and 40 years old. The remaining 17% of the
participants were above 40 years old. 53% of the partici-
pants were female. 69% of the participants had a master
or doctoral degree. 50% of the participants used 2FA for
online banking and only 13% used Google 2SV to access
their email accounts.
SUS Scores. The mean SUS score for Sound-Proof was
91.09 (±5.44). The mean SUS score for Google 2SV
was 79.45 (±7.56). Figure 7(a) and Figure 7(b) show
participant answers on 5-point Likert-scales for Sound-
Proof and for Google 2SV, respectively. To analyze
the statistical significance of these results, we used the
following null hypothesis: “there will be no difference
in perceived usability between Sound-Proof and Google
2SV”. A one-way ANOVA test revealed that the dif-
ference of the SUS scores was statistically significant
(F(1,31) = 21.698, p < .001, η2p = .412), thus the null
hypothesis can be rejected. We concluded that users per-
ceive Sound-Proof to be more usable than Google 2SV.
Appendix A reports the items of the SUS.
Login Time. We measured the login time from the
moment when a participant clicked on the “login” but-
ton (right after entering the password), to the moment
when that participant was logged in. We neglected the
time spent entering username and password because we
wanted to focus only on the time required by the 2FA
mechanism. Login time for Sound-Proof was 4.7 sec-
onds (±0.2 seconds); this time was required for the
phone to receive the computer’s sample and compare it
with the one recorded locally. With Google 2SV, login
time increased to 24.4 seconds (±7.1 seconds); this time
was required for the participant to take the phone, start
the application and copy the verification code from the
phone to the browser.
Failure Rates. We did not witness any login failure for
either of the two methods. We speculate that this may
be due to the priming of the users right before the experi-
ment, when we explained how the two methods work and
that Sound-Proof may require users to make some noise
in quiet environments.
Post-test Questionnaire. The post-test questionnaire
was designed to collect information on the perceived
quickness of the two mechanisms (Q1–Q2) and partic-
ipants willingness to adopt any of the schemes (Q3–Q6).
We also included items to inquire if participants would
feel comfortable using the mechanisms in different envi-
ronments (Q7–Q14). Figure 7(c) shows participants an-
swers on 5-point Likert-scales. The full text of the items
can be found in Appendix B.
All participants found Sound-Proof to be quick (Q1),
while only 50% of the participants found Google 2SV to
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Figure 7: Distribution of the answers by the participants of the user study. System Usability Scale (SUS) of Sound-Proof (a)
and Google 2-Step Verification (b), as well as the Post-test questionnaire (c). Percentages on the left side include participants that
answered “Strongly disagree” or “Disagree”. Percentages in the middle account for participants that answered “Neither agree, nor
disagree”. Percentages on the right side include participants that answered “Agree” or “Strongly agree”.
be quick (Q2). If 2FA were mandatory, 84% of the par-
ticipants would use Sound-Proof (Q3) and 47% would
use Google 2SV (Q4). In case 2FA were optional the
percentage of participants willing to use the two mecha-
nisms dropped to 78% for Sound-Proof (Q5) and to 19%
for Google 2SV (Q6). Similar to [36, 12], our results
for Google 2SV suggest that users are likely not to use
2FA if it is optional. With Sound-Proof, the difference
in user acceptance between a mandatory and an optional
scenario is only 6%.
We asked participants if they would feel comfortable
using either mechanism at home, at their workplace, in a
cafe, and in a library. 95% of the participants would feel
comfortable using Sound-Proof at home (Q7) and 77%
of the participants would use it at the workplace (Q8).
68% would use it in a cafe (Q9) and 50% would use it
in a library (Q10). Most participants (between 91% and
82%) would feel comfortable using Google 2SV in any
of the scenario we considered (Q11–Q14).
The results of the post-test questionnaire suggest that
users may be willing to adopt Sound-Proof because it
is quicker and causes less burden, compared to Google
2SV. In some public places, however, users may feel
more comfortable using Google 2SV. In Section 9 we
discuss how to integrate the two approaches.
The post-test questionnaire allowed participants to
comment on the 2FA mechanisms evaluated. Most par-
ticipants found Sound-Proof to be user-friendly and ap-
preciated the lack of interaction with the phone. Ap-
pendix C lists some of the users’ comments.
9 Discussion
Software and Hardware Requirements. Similar to
any other 2FA based on software tokens, Sound-Proof
requires an application on the user’s phone. Sound-
Proof, however, does not require additional software on
the computer and seamlessly works with any HTML5-
compliant browser that implements the WebRTC API.
Chrome, Firefox and Opera, already support WebRTC
and a version of Internet Explorer supporting WebRTC
will soon be released [31]. Sound-Proof needs the phone
to have a data connection. Moreover, both the phone
and the computer where the browser is running must be
equipped with a microphone. Microphones are ubiqui-
tous in phones, tablets and laptops. If a computer such
as a desktop machine does not have an embedded mi-
crophone, Sound-Proof requires an external microphone,
like the one of a webcam.
Other Browsers. Section 7 evaluates Sound-Proof using
Google Chrome. We have also tested Sound-Proof with
Mozilla Firefox and Opera. Each browser may use dif-
ferent algorithms to process the recorded audio (e.g., fil-
tering for noise reduction), before delivering it to the web
application. The WebRTC specification does not yet de-
fine how the recorded audio should be processed, leaving
the specifics of the implementation to the browser ven-
dor. When we ran our tests, Opera behaved like Chrome.
Firefox audio processing was slightly different and it af-
fected the performance our prototype. In particular, the
Equal Error Rate computed over the samples collected
while using Firefox was 0.012. We speculate that a bet-
ter Equal Error Rate can be achieved with any browser if
the software token performs the same audio processing
of the browser being used to log in.
Privacy. The noise in the user’s environment may leak
private information to a prying server. In our design,
the audio recorded by the phone is never uploaded to
the server. A malicious server can also access the com-
puter’s microphone while the user is visiting the server’s
webpage. This is already the case for a number of web-
sites that require access to the microphone. For exam-
ple, websites for language learning, Gmail (for video-
chats or phone calls), live chat-support services, or any
site that uses speech-recognition require access to the
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microphone and may record the ambient noise any time
the user visits the provider’s webpage. All browsers we
tested ask the user for permission before allowing a web-
site to use getUserMedia. Moreover, browsers show an
alert when a website triggers recording from the micro-
phone. Providers are likely not to abuse the recording ca-
pability, since their reputation would be affected, if users
detect unsolicited recording.
Quiet Environments. Sound-Proof rejects a login at-
tempt if the power of either sample is below τdB. In
case the environment is too quiet, the website can prompt
the user to make any noise (by, e.g., clearing his throat,
knocking on the table, etc.).
Fallback to Code-based 2FA. Sound-Proof can be com-
bined with 2FA mechanisms based on verification codes,
like Google 2SV. For example, the webpage can employ
Sound-Proof as the default 2FA mechanism, but give to
the user the option to log in entering a verification code.
This may be useful in cases where the environment is
quiet and the user feels uncomfortable making noise. Lo-
gin based on verification codes is also convenient when
the phone has no data connectivity (e.g., when roaming).
Failed Login Attempts and Throttling. Sound-Proof
deems a login attempt as fraudulent if the similarity score
between the two samples is below the threshold τC or if
the power of either sample is below τdB. In this case, the
server may request the two devices to repeat the record-
ing and comparison phase. After a pre-defined number of
failed trials, the server can fall-back to a 2FA mechanism
based on verification codes. The server can also throttle
login attempts in order to prevent “brute-force” attacks
and to protect the user’s phone battery from draining.
Login Evidence. Since audio recording and comparison
is transparent to the user, he has no means to detect an
ongoing attack. To mitigate this, at each login attempt
the phone may vibrate, light up, or display a message to
notify the user that a login attempt is taking place. The
Sound-Proof application may also keep a log of the lo-
gin attempts. Such techniques can help to make the user
aware of fraudulent login attempts. Nevertheless, we
stress that the user does not have to attend to the phone
during legitimate login attempts.
Continuous Authentication. Sound-Proof can also be
used as a form of continuous authentication. The server
can periodically trigger Sound-Proof, while the user is
logged in and interacts with the website. If the recordings
of the two devices do not match, the server can forcibly
log the user out. Nevertheless, such use can have a more
significant impact on the user’s privacy, as well as affect
the battery life of the user’s phone.
Alternative Devices. Our 2FA mechanism uses the
phone as a software token. Another option is to use a
smartwatch and we plan to develop a Sound-Proof appli-
cation for smartwatches based on Android Wear and Ap-
ple Watch. We speculate that smartwatches can further
lower the false rejection rate because of the proximity of
the computer and the smartwatch during logins.
Logins from the Phone. If a user tries to log in from the
same device where the Sound-Proof application is run-
ning, the browser and the application will capture audio
through the same microphone and, therefore, the login
attempt will be accepted. This requires the mobile OS to
allow access to the microphone by the browser and, at the
same time, by the Sound-Proof application. If the mobile
OS does not allow concurrent access to the microphone,
Sound-Proof can fall back to code-based 2FA.
Comparative Analysis. We use the framework of Bon-
neau et al. [10] to compare Sound-Proof with Google 2-
Step Verification (Google 2SV), with PhoneAuth [14],
and with the 2FA protocol of [41] that uses WiFi to cre-
ate a channel between the phone and the computer (re-
ferred to as FBD-WF-WF in [41]). The framework of
Bonneau et al. considers 25 “benefits” that an authen-
tication scheme should provide, categorized in terms of
usability, deployability, and security. Table 3 shows the
overall comparison. The evaluation of Google 2SV in
Table 3 matches the one reported by [10], besides the
fact that we consider Google 2SV to be non-proprietary.
Usability: No scheme is scalable nor it is effortless for
the user because they all require a password as the first
authentication factor. They are all “Quasi-Nothing-to-
Carry” because they leverage the user’s phone. Sound-
Proof and PhoneAuth are more efficient to use than
Google 2SV because they do not require the user to in-
teract with his phone. They are also more efficient to
use than FBD-WF-WF, because the latter requires a non-
negligible setup time every time the user logs in from a
new computer. All mechanisms incur some errors if the
user enters the wrong password (Infrequent-Errors). All
mechanisms also require similar recovery procedures if
the user loses his phone. Deployability: Sound-Proof,
PhoneAuth, and FBD-WF-WF score better than Google
2SV in the category “Accessible” because the user is
asked nothing but his password. The three schemes are
also better than Google 2SV in terms of cost per user,
assuming users already have a phone. None of the mech-
anisms is server-compatible. Sound-Proof and Google
2SV are the only browser-compatible mechanisms as
they require no changes to current browsers or comput-
ers. Google 2SV is more mature, and all of them are non-
proprietary. Security: The security provided by Sound-
Proof, PhoneAuth, and FBD-WF-WF is similar to the
one provided by Google 2SV. However, we rate Sound-
Proof and PhoneAuth as not resilient to targeted imper-
sonation, since a targeted, co-located attacker can launch
the attack from the victim’s environment. FBD-WF-WF
uses a paired connection between the user’s computer
and phone, and can better resist such attacks.
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Sound-Proof S Y Y S S Y Y Y Y S Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Google 2SV S Y S S S S S Y Y Y S S Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
PhoneAuth S Y Y S S Y Y Y S Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
FBD-WF-WF S Y S S S Y Y Y S S Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 3: Comparison of Sound-Proof against Google 2-Step Verification (Google 2SV), PhoneAuth [14], and FBD-WF-WF [41],
using the framework of Bonneau et al. [10]. We use ‘Y’ to denote that the benefit is provided and ‘S’ to denote that the benefit is
somewhat provided.
10 Related Work
Section 3 discusses alternative approaches to 2FA. In the
following we review related work that leverages audio to
verify the proximity of two devices.
Halevi et al., [27] use ambient audio to detect the prox-
imity of two devices to thwart relay attacks in NFC pay-
ment systems. They compute the cross-correlation be-
tween the audio recorded by the two devices and employ
machine-learning techniques to tell whether the two sam-
ples were recorded at the same location or not. The au-
thors claim perfect results (0 false acceptance and false
rejection rate). They, however, assume the two devices to
have the same hardware (the experiment campaign used
two Nokia N97 phones). Furthermore, their setup allows
a maximum distance of 30 centimeters between the two
devices. Our application scenario (web authentication)
requires a solution that works (i) with heterogeneous de-
vices, (ii) indoors and outdoors, and (iii) irrespective of
the phone’s position (e.g., in the user’s pocket or purse).
As such, we propose a different function to compute
the similarity of the two samples, which we empirically
found to be more robust, than what proposed in [27], in
our settings.
Truong et al., [46] investigate relay attacks in zero-
interaction authentication systems and use techniques
similar to the ones of [27]. They propose a framework
that detects co-location of two devices comparing fea-
tures from multiple sensors, including GPS, Bluetooth,
WiFi and audio. The authors conclude that an audio-only
solution is not robust to detect co-location (20% of false
rejections) and advocate for the combination of multiple
sensors. Furthermore, their technique requires the two
devices to sense the environment for 10 seconds. This
time budget may not be available for web authentication.
The authors of [40] use ambient audio to derive a pair-
wise cryptographic key between two co-located devices.
They use an audio fingerprinting scheme similar to the
one of [26] and leverage fuzzy commitment schemes to
accommodate for the difference of the two recordings.
Their scheme may, in principle, be used to verify proxim-
ity of two devices in a 2FA mechanism. However, the ex-
periments of [40] reveal that the key derivation is hardly
feasible in outdoor scenarios. Our scheme takes advan-
tage of noisy environments and, therefore, can be used in
outdoor scenarios like train stations.
11 Conclusion
We proposed Sound-Proof, a two-factor authentication
mechanism that does not require the user to interact
with his phone and that can already be used with ma-
jor browsers. We have shown that Sound-Proof works
even if the phone is in the user’s pocket or purse, and
that it fares well both indoors and outdoors. Participants
of a user study rated Sound-Proof to be more usable than
Google 2-Step Verification. More importantly, most par-
ticipants would use Sound-Proof for online services in
which 2FA is optional. Sound-Proof improves the us-
ability and deployability of 2FA and, as such, can foster
large-scale adoption.
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Appendix
A System Usability Scale
We report the items of the System Usability Scale [11].
All items were answered with a 5-point Likert-scale from
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.
Q1 I think that I would like to use this system frequently.
Q2 I found the system unnecessarily complex.
Q3 I thought the system was easy to use.
Q4 I think that I would need the support of a technical person
to be able to use this system.
Q5 I found the various functions in this system were well in-
tegrated.
Q6 I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system.
Q7 I would imagine that most people would learn to use this
system very quickly.
Q8 I found the system very cumbersome to use.
Q9 I felt very confident using the system.
Q10 I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going
with this system.
B Post-test Questionnaire
We report the items of the post-test questionnaire. All
items were answered with a 5-point Likert-scale from
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.
Q1 I thought the audio-based method was quick.
Q2 I thought the code-based method was quick.
Q3 If Second-Factor Authentication were mandatory, I would
use the audio-based method to log in.
Q4 If Second-Factor Authentication were mandatory, I would
use the code-based method to log in.
Q5 If Second-Factor Authentication were optional, I would
use the audio-based method to log in.
Q6 If Second-Factor Authentication were optional, I would
use the code-based method to log in.
Q7 I would feel comfortable using the audio-based method at
home.
Q8 I would feel comfortable using the audio-based method at
my workplace.
Q9 I would feel comfortable using the audio-based method in
a cafe.
Q10 I would feel comfortable using the audio-based method in
a library.
Q11 I would feel comfortable using the code-based method at
home.
Q12 I would feel comfortable using the code-based method at
my workplace.
Q13 I would feel comfortable using the code-based method in
a cafe.
Q14 I would feel comfortable using the code-based method in
a library.
C User Comments
This section lists some of the comments that participants
added to their post-test questionnaire.
“Sound-Proof is faster and automatic. Increased security
without having to do more things”
“I would use Sound-Proof, because it is less complicated
and faster. I do not need to unlock the phone and open the
application. In a public place it would feel a bit awkward
unless it becomes widespread. Anyway, I am already logged
in most websites that I use.”
“I like the audio idea, because what I hate the most about
second-factor authentication is to have to take my phone out
or find it around.”
“Sound-Proof is much easier. I am security-conscious and
already use 2FA. I would be willing to switch to the audio-
based method.”
“I already use Google 2SV and prefer it because I think it’s
more secure. However, Sound-Proof is seamless.”
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